

Message Text

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SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER
VAN DER KLAAUW, APRIL 11, 1978

1. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY MET THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR
AN HOUR FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH. THE WIDE-RANGING
CONVERSATION COVERED NATO AND THE DUTCH CONTRIBUTION, THE
DUTCH AID EFFORT, ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS, NON-PRO-
LIFERATION AND THE PROBLEM OF ENRICHED URANIUM TO BRAZIL,
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THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, EAST-WEST ISSUES
AND THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, PREPARATIONS FOR THE BONN
SUMMIT, MTN, AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, CYPRUS, PANAMA,
CHILE AND ARGENTINA, AND NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS. AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING THE FOREIGN MINISTER INVITED
THE SECRETARY TO VISIT THE HAGUE. END SUMMARY

2. THE PARTICIPANTS ARE LISTED IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH
OF THIS MESSAGE.

INTRODUCTION

3. AFTER THE SECRETARY'S WELCOME, THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT HIS TRIP TO THE US WAS HIS FIRST AS FOREIGN

MINISTER AFTER HIS TRADITIONAL FIRST VISITS TO THE OTHER BENELUX CAPITALS. HE NOTED THE HAPPY ABSENCE OF BILATERAL PROBLEMS SINCE THE AIR TRAFFIC AGREEMENT WAS NOW SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED.

NATO

4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THE DUTCH CONTINUED TO BE STRONG SUPPORTERS OF NATO. WHILE HE CONSIDERED THE DUTCH CONTRIBUTION GENERALLY SATISFACTORY HE RECOGNIZED MORE WAS NEEDED. HE SAID THE DUTCH MINISTER OF DEFENSE, CONSULTING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD WRITTEN THE PRIME MINISTER URGING A GOVERNMENT DECISION FOR AN INCREASE IN THE DUTCH NATO CONTRIBUTION BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT. SUCH A DECISION TO EXCEPT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FROM THE GENERAL BUDGET CUTTING EFFORT WOULD CLEARLY RESULT IN A CABINET FIGHT BUT HE HOPED TO WIN. THE FINANCE MINISTER WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE DEBATE.

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DUTCH ATD

5. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT THE DUTCH AID CONTRIBUTION WOULD ALSO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE BUDGET CUTTING EXERCISE. THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, HAS DECIDED NOT TO EXPORT ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS TO THE THIRD WORLD. HE NOTED THAT DUTCH AID CONTRIBUTIONS SOON WILL REACH TWO BILLION GUILDERS A YEAR WHICH HE CONSIDERS A GOOD FIGURE FOR A COUNTRY THE SIZE OF THE NETHERLANDS.

ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTER RECOGNIZES THE DUTCH HAVE NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. THE GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, HAD ARGUED THAT THE DECISION TO PRODUCE RESTED WITH THE US AND THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONCUR WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY MOTION CHARACTERIZING PRODUCTION AS UNDESIRABLE. THE GOVERNMENT'S RELUCTANCE TO AGREE TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE WEAPONS IN THE NETHERLANDS, HE SAID, WAS NOT A RESULT OF PRESSURE BY THE SOVIETS BUT OF THE STRONG NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST A WEAPON DESIGNED TO KILL PEOPLE AND SPARE PROPERTY. THE FOREIGN MINISTER FEARS THAT THE DEBATE ON ERW'S COULD SPREAD TO OTHER TACTICAL WEAPONS.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WAS SOUND AND HE SUPPORTED IT. BY DEFERRING THE DECISION ON PRODUCTION AND BY DECIDING TO PROCEED WITH

MODERNIZATION OF THE LANCE WARHEAD AND THE EIGHT INCH SHELL, THE PRESIDENT HAD ENSURED ERW'S COULD BE OPERATIONAL QUICKLY IF HE LATER DECIDED IN FAVOR

OF THEIR PRODUCTION. THE SECRETARY SAID IN MAKING HIS ULTIMATE DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT, THE PRESIDENT WOULD TAKE IMPORTANT ACCOUNT OF ANY UNILATERAL RESTRAINT BY THE SOVIETS IN REDUCING THE THREAT TO THE SECRET

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SECURITY OF NATO. THE REMAINING QUESTION WAS WHAT SOVIET INITIATIVES WOULD BE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE. IT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH, HE SAID, FOR THE SOVIETS TO REFRAIN FROM PRODUCING ERW'S: THEY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO ACTUALLY REDUCE THE PRESENT THREAT TO EUROPE.

8. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE, THE SECRETARY SAID, THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF ERW'S WAS PREMISED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THEY ARE LESS HUMANITARIAN THAN CONVENTIONAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS. IN FACT, SINCE ERW'S WOULD AFFECT A MORE LIMITED AREA, THEY WOULD REDUCE HUMAN CASUALTIES AS WELL AS DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT. THE REASON THE SOVIETS ARE SO OPPOSED TO ERW'S WAS THAT THEY RECOGNIZED THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST TANKS. THE CURRENT GERMAN POSITION ON DEPLOYMENT HE SAID, WAS THAT IF ONE OTHER CONTINENTAL POWER AGREED TO DEPLOYMENT THE FRG WOULD AGREE ALSO. THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED THAT BREZHNEV'S VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH WAS ONLY THE SOVIET'S OPENING ROUND.

9. THE SECRETARY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF THE DUTCH POSITION ON PRODUCTION WAS FIRM OR WHETHER THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT IT DEPENDED IN PART ON THE TIMING OF ANY US DECISION. THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT COULD PROBABLY NOT CHANGE ITS POSITION OF OPPOSITION TO PRODUCTION OF THE ERW -- EVEN IN THE FACE OF A NEGATIVE SOVIET RESPONSE -- UNLESS WE GAVE THE SOVIETS AT LEAST A YEAR TO REACT. HE THOUGHT DUTCH PUBLIC OPINION WAS SO STRONG THAT IT WOULD TAKE THAT MUCH TIME BEFORE IT COULD BE EXPECTED TO VIEW THE ISSUE IN A LESS EMOTIONAL WAY.

10. REGARDING DEPLOYMENT, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID SECRET

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THE DUTCH HAD TAKEN NO POSITION BUT HAVE TOLD PARLIAMENT THAT IF THE SOVIETS FAIL TO RESPOND WITH DISARMAMENT MEASURES, THE SITUATION WILL BE A NEW ONE AND THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT WILL LOOK AT IT AGAIN.

11. AMBASSADOR BAKKER NOTED THAT OVER THE WEEKEND THE INITIAL REACTION IN THE US TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO POSTPONE PRODUCTION OF THE ERW SEEMED TO BE EXTREMELY NEGATIVE. HE ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY CHANGE IN THE US PUBLIC OPINION? THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS TOO EARLY BUT IN TIME HE HOPED AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE DECISION WOULD CHANGE. A LOT WILL DEPEND ON WHAT

THE SOVIETS DO OR DON'T DO. IN RESPONSE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S QUESTION, THE SECRETARY SAID THE US HAS PURPOSELY NOT PLACED A TIME LIMIT ON A SOVIET RESPONSE.

12. THE SECRETARY SAID HE EXPECTED BREZHNEV WOULD PROBABLY RAISE THE ERW IN MOSCOW. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE HOPED IT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN MAY.

NON-PROLIFERATION

13. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED HE HAD HAD A GOOD DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR SMITH (SEPTTEL). THE FOREIGN MINISTER REFERRED TO THE DUTCH PROBLEMS WITH THE UK AND THE GERMANS, AND BRAZIL ON THE QUESTION OF SUPPLYING ENRICHED FUEL TO BRAZIL AND ASKED THE SECRETARY IF HE COULD REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATION IN BRAZIL. THE SECRETARY SAID THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE BRAZILIAN POSITION FROM A FEW MONTHS AGO. THEY DO NOT SHARE OUR VIEW ON REPROCESSING AND ARGUE THAT SINCE THEY LACK OUR ABUNDANCE OF COAL AND OIL THEY APPROACH THE QUESTION OF REPROCESSING FROM A DIFFERENT PROSPECTIVE. THE SECRETARY ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IN BRAZIL
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WAS BEGINNING TO HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS PARTICULARLY SINCE THE COSTS OF REPROCESSING WILL BE CLEARLY VASTLY LARGER THAN INITIAL ESTIMATES. HE FEARED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISSUE MIGHT BE DECIDED ON POLITICAL RATHER THAN ON TECHNOLOGICAL GROUNDS AND THAT BRAZIL IS MOVING DOWN THE ROAD TOWARD REPROCESSING.

UN SPECIAL SESSION DISARMAMENT (UNSSOD)

14. MRS. BENSON SAID THE US IS HAVING DIFFICULTY PERSUADING THE LDCS TO RESTRAIN THEIR PURCHASE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. DO THE DUTCH HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW THE US MIGHT BE MORE PERSUASIVE, BOTH WITH SUPPLIERS AND CONSUMERS? THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HOLLAND IS NOT A BIG ARMS PRODUCER BUT EVEN IT IS UNDER STRONG ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO SELL ARMS. THE DIFFICULTY IS TO GET SUPPLIERS TO AGREE ON SOME RULES.

15. MR. COOPER SAID LDCS SHOULD NOT EXPECT CONCESSIONARY

AID AND AT THE SAME TIME OBTAIN ARMS FROM US. MRS. BENSON NOTED THE LDCS ARGUE THAT THEY HAVE LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED IF THE US LINKS AID WITH MILITARY PURCHASES AND MRS. BENSON SAID THAT AID DOES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE PROBLEM IS THAT IF ONE SAYS NO TO AN LDC THEN THEY GO TO ANOTHER ARMS SUPPLIER. HE NOTED THE OPTION TO IMPOSE A

CONDITION: IF THE LDC GOES ELSEWHERE FOR ARMS, NO DEVELOPMENT AID. MR. RUTTEN NOTED THAT, HOLLAND SOLD SOME CRUISERS TO PERU AND A PENDING SALE OF DUTCH-BUILT FRIGATES TO IRAN IS A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH FOR THE DUTCH SHIPPING INDUSTRY. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ARMS TRANSFERS BECOME VERY, VERY IMPORTANT.

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16. THE SECRETARY SAID VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT PEREZ SAID THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP AT THE SSOD TO ACHIEVE SOME MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN ARMS PURCHASES BY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. HE SAID IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO GET THE SOVIETS, AS AN ARMS SUPPLIER, TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM WITH A VIEW TO RESTRAINING ARMS SALES. THERE HAS BEEN ONE MEETING AND WE ARE TRYING TO GET THEM TO AGREE TO A SECOND. THE SOVIETS WANT TO START WITH A SAMPLE AREA AND PROPOSE THE MIDDLE EAST BUT THEY SAY IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO WAIT FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THERE BEFORE APPLYING ANY RESTRAINT. WHEN THE US RAISED THIS SUBJECT WITH THE BRITISH, GERMANS AND FRENCH, THE SECRETARY SAID THEIR POSITION WAS THE US MUST FIRST GET SOVIET AGREEMENT TO ARMS SALES RESTRAINTS.

EAST-WEST ISSUES AND THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

17. REGARDING THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT DESPITE THE LIMITED RESULTS THERE HAD BEEN POSITIVE ELEMENTS. THE FULL DISCUSSION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS, AND THE AGREEMENT TO MEET AGAIN IN MADRID IN 1980 WERE INDICATIONS THAT A MEANINGFUL REVIEW PROCESS HAD BEGUN. IT WOULD TAKE TIME, HE SAID, TO EVALUATE ITS IMPACT. IF MADRID PROCEEDS ALONG THE SAME LINES AS BELGRADE IT MIGHT INDICATE THAT MOVEMENT TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS WILL BE VERY SLOW. BUT MADRID MIGHT PRODUCE RESULTS WHICH WOULD FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION.

18. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN USEFUL. MANY ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE HELSINKI ACCORDS HAD BEEN TAKEN LARGELY IN ANTICIPATION OF THE CONFERENCE. DECIDING ON A MADRID REVIEW WILL PRESUMABLY

HAVE THE SAME EFFECT. WE WERE NOT SURPRISED NOT TO GET
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A MORE COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OUT OF BELGRADE. THE SOVIETS WERE UNWILLING TO SIGN SO SOON ANOTHER PAPER AGAINST WHICH THEY COULD BE JUDGED.

19. MR. NIMETZ NOTED THAT SOME 80 NEW PROPOSALS HAD BEEN FLOATED. PRIOR TO THE MADRID CONFERENCE, HE SAID, WE MUST WORK CAREFULLY BOTH BILATERALLY AND MULTI-ATERALLY TO AGREE TO SIX OR EIGHT ON WHICH POSITIVE ACTION CAN BE TAKEN. PUBLIC OPINION HAS FOCUSSED ON THE NEED FOR PARALLEL PROGRESS IN ALL BASKETS. THE SOVIETS FOCUS ON THE ECONOMIC ISSUES, THE NEUTRALS SUCH AS RUMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND AUSTRIA ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING, AND THE US ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS.

20. MR. VEST STRESSED THE EVOLUTIONARY ASPECT OF CSCE. HE NOTED THAT THE EC MEMBERS HAD COOPERATED CAREFULLY AMONG THEMSELVES PRIOR TO THE BELGRADE MEETING AND HE HOPED THAT SAME SPIRIT WOULD SPREAD OVER INTO THE NATO CONTEXT WHERE WE COULD EXAMINE WHICH INITIATIVES TO ADOPT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED. HE SAID THAT THE POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE NINE WAS AN IMPORTANT AND HELPFUL DEVELOPMENT BUT THAT ISSUES SUCH AS CSCE MUST BE HANDLED IN NATO WHERE CONSULTATIONS MUST BE STRENGTHENED. HE NOTED THAT IN QTE THE OLD DAYS UNQTE NATO POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS HAD BEEN DEEPER THAN NOW.

PREPARATIONS FOR BONN SUMMIT

21. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE FOCUS OF THE APRIL 7 AND 8 EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING IN COPENHAGEN HAD BEEN ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS WITH MONETARY PROBLEMS DISCUSSED IN THE RESTRICTED SESSIONS AT DINNER. THE
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COMMUNITY, HE SAID, HAD DECIDED TO PUSH FOR A CONCERTED ACTION PROGRAM WHICH COULD BE APPROVED AT THE NEXT EC SUMMIT IN BREMEM JULY 2-3. THEN THE EC COULD BRING ITS PROGRAM TO THE BONN SUMMIT LATER IN JULY. THE COMMISSION HAD BEEN TOLD TO BEGIN TALKS WITH MEMBER GOVERNMENTS AND COME UP WITH SPECIFIC PROGRAMS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IN JUNE HE WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO JUDGE IF THE COMMUNITY COULD COME TO THE BONN SUMMIT WITH CONCRETE PROPOSALS. THE FACT THAT THE EC COUNCIL MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN BREMEM WITH AN FRG CHAIRMAN, AUGURED WELL. HE SAID THE COMMUNITY HAD DECIDED AGAINST THE SO-CALLED LOCOMOTIVE THEORY, WITH GERMANY IN THE LEAD. ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO PULL TOGETHER. MR. COOPER NOTED THAT THE UK

WAS DEBATING ITS BUDGET TODAY. THE FRG WAS WAITING FOR

FIRST QUARTER RESULTS -- THE CHANCELLOR ARGUES EVEN THAT IS TOO SOON -- BEFORE MAKING ANY DECISION. MR. COOPER SAID NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS HAD TO PULL TOGETHER WITH COMPLEMENTARY ACTIONS.

22. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE EUROPEANS WERE CONCERNED THAT JAPAN WAS NOT DOING ENOUGH AND NOTED THAT THE EC BALANCE OF TRADE WITH JAPAN WAS AS BAD AS OURS. AT THE LEAST, JAPAN CAN INCREASE ITS NON-TIED AID TO THE THIRD WORLD. THE SECRETARY AGREED. WHEN PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA COMES HERE WE WILL STRESS THE NEED FOR RAISING GROWTH TARGETS, INCREASING JAPANESE IMPORTS AND TAKING MORE CONSTRUCTIVE POSITIONS AT THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT JAPAN HAS POLITICAL PROBLEMS BUT THEY MUST ACT SOON IF THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD IS TO DEVELOP A COHESIVE COMMON PROGRAM. MR. COOPER CAUTIONED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS STEADY PRESSURE. IT WOULD DO NO GOOD TO LASH OUT AT THEM. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED.

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23. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT WAS THE FUNCTION OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE OECD IN PREPARING FOR THE BONN SUMMIT. MR. COOPER SAID THE QTE BUREAU UNQTE OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY COMMITTEE HAD BEEN CHARGED BY THE PREPARATORY GROUP WITH COMING UP WITH PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD BE TABLED BY MEMBERS INDIVIDUALLY. HE BELIEVES IT MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL TO HAVE THE OECD SECRETARIAT DIRECTLY INVOLVED. HE SAID THIS COULD BE ADDRESSED AT THE COMMITTEE MEETING IN LATE MAY.

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATORS (MTN)

24. MR. COOPER SAID THAT THE MTN WAS ENTERING AN INTENSIVE PHASE. THE SITUATION WAS COMPLICATED BY THE SIZE OF THE AGENDA AND THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS. SOME COMMUNITY MEMBERS -- NOT THE NETHERLANDS -- APPEARED TO BE DRAGGING THEIR FEET. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS TALK IN THE COMMUNITY OF NEGOTIATING ON THE BASIS OF ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWALS. THE US FAVORED BARGAINING NOW ON THE BASIS OF AN ENRICHMENT OF OFFERS THOUGHT TO BE WEAK RATHER THAN WITH WITHDRAWALS FROM THE STRONGER OFFERS. MR. COOPER SAID WE ACCEPT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SAFEGUARDS ISSUE TO THE EUROPEANS BUT WE FEAR INITIATIVES ALONG THE BRITISH LINE -- PERMITTING COUNTRIES TO ACT UNILATERALLY AGAINST OTHERS OUTSIDE OF THE MOST FAVORED NATION FRAMEWORK -- COULD UNRAVEL THE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

25. MR. COOPER SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE RESULTS OF THE

MEETINGS BETWEEN STRAUSS AND GUNDELACH. IN GENERAL
TERMS THE US SEEKS A WHEAT AGREEMENT WHEREAS THE EC IS
MORE INTERESTED IN A GRAINS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING FEED
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GRAINS. ON FEED GRAINS WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SUB-
SIDIZED DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS FEED GRAINS BY COMMUNITY
COUNTRIES. WE WOULD PREFER EC COUNTRIES USE SURPLUSES
TO ADD TO STOCKS.

AFRICA

26. MR. RUTTEN SAID THE DISCUSSION AT THE APRIL 7-8
EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON RHODESIA HAD BEEN DOMINATED BY AN
EXPOSE BY OWEN WHOSE POSITION WAS KNOWN TO THE US. ON
NAMIBIA, THE COUNCIL HAD ADOPTED A RESOLUTION SUPPORTING
THE INITIATIVE OF THE FIVE, BUT DID NOT DEAL WITH THE
WALVIS BAY QUESTION. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD COMMUNI-
CATED OUR STAND ON WALVIS BAY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
OF THE FRONT LINE STATES AND NIGERIA AT THE LAGOS
MEETING. OUR VIEW IS THAT FROM A STRICTLY LEGAL STAND-
POINT SOUTH AFRICA HAS THE BETTER CASE BUT THE ISSUE
MUST BE DECIDED ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
GROUNDS. ON THIS BASIS, WE CONSIDER THAT AFTER NEGOTIA-
TIONS BETWEEN AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA,
WALVIS BAY SHOULD GO TO NAMIBIA. WE ARE PREPARED TO
STATE THAT POSITION PUBLICALLY IN THE UN ONLY IF SWAPO
INDICATES THAT IT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS OF
THE FIVE.

MIDDLE EAST

27. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE DUTCH HAVE GREAT PROB-
LEMS WITH THE PRESENT ISRAELI-BEGIN POSITION ON UN
RESOLUTION 242 AND THE WEST BANK.

28. THE SECRETARY SAID THE US IS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY
BEGIN'S POSITION THAT IT NO LONGER APPLIES TO THE WEST
BANK. THIS HAD BEEN A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE. THE BEGIN
GOVERNMENT IS CHANGING THE WHOLE BASIS OF THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS. IT IS A VERY BAD DEVELOPMENT.

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29. ON SETTLEMENTS THE SECRETARY SAID AT A MINIMUM THE
US BELIEVES THERE MUST BE A HALT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE ANY NEW SETTLEMENTS. THERE IS A CHANGING SENTI-
MENT IN ISRAEL TOWARDS THIS ISSUE. A RECENT POLL SHOWED
THAT SOME 68 PERCENT OF THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT THE

SETTLEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME AN IMPEDIMENT TO PEACE. THE SECRETARY SAID THERE SHOULD BE AN INTERIM SOLUTION, FOLLOWED BY A PERMANENT SOLUTION. WE COULD POSSIBLY BUILD ON THE BEGIN PLAN. SADAT ACKNOWLEDGES

THAT THERE IS A REAL SECURITY PROBLEM FOR THE ISRAELIS IN THE WEST BANK. IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT THERE COULD BE SOME ARRANGEMENT FOR THE STATIONING OF ISRAELI TROOPS IN THE WEST BANK IN ENCAMPMENTS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. THERE SHOULD BE SOME FORM OF PALESTINIAN SELF-RULE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. THE SECRETARY SAID SADAT HAS TO HAVE A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE DIRECT DIALOGUE TO CONTINUE -- WHICH REALLY IS NOW ONLY SPUTTERING ALONG. IF NOTHING HAPPENS WE WILL BE PREPARED TO SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO GET THE PROCESS OF PEACE STARTED AGAIN. WE CANNOT ALLOW A STALEMATE TO DEVELOP.

30. THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS PACKAGE HAS BETTER THAN A 50 PERCENT CHANCE OF PASSING CONGRESS. IT WILL BE SENT UP AFTER THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY VOTE NEXT WEEK.

CYPRUS

31. THE SECRETARY SAID ECEVIT BELIEVES THAT HIS MAIN PROBLEMS ARE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AND HE WOULD LIKE TO GET RID OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. HE SEES CYPRUS AS A
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DRAIN ON TURKEY'S TIME AND ENERGY. IN THE LONG RUN, HE PROBABLY WILL BE FORTHCOMING. THE AEGEAN SEA IS A TOUGHER PROBLEM THAN CYPRUS.

32. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT ACCORDING TO KARAMANLIS, ECEVIT TALKED TO HIM ABOUT FOUR PROBLEMS: THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, AIR RIGHTS, TURKISH MINORITIES IN GREECE, AND THE MILITARIZATION OF GREEK BASES. PARADOXICALLY, KARAMANLIS NEEDS MORE TIME WHILE ECEVIT NEEDS TO MOVE QUICKLY. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE TECHNICAL PREPARATION MEETING FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT HAS BEEN POSTPONED.

33. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULT INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN GREECE, THE EC MUST MAKE PROGRESS ON GREEK ENTRY. MR. RUTTEN SAID THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE NINE ARE VERY AWARE THAT WHEN GREECE JOINS THE EC, THE TURKS WILL FEEL EVEN MORE ISOLATED. FOR THIS REASON, THE DIRECTORS HAVE AGREED TO WORK OUT SOME PROCEDURES FOR MAINTAINING A DIALOGUE WITH THE TURKS ON THE QUESTION OF GREEK MEMBERSHIP.

34. THE SECRETARY SAID THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE REACTION TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST TURKEY WAS MORE POSI-

TIVE THAN WE HAD EXPECTED. THERE WILL BE STRONG OPPOSITION -- ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR -- BUT IF THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ON CYPRUS ARE REASONABLY FORTHCOMING WE HAVE A CHANCE. HOWEVER, THE SENATE PROBABLY WILL BE

MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE HOUSE.

35. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THE FATE OF THE SECOND PANAMA CANAL TREATY IS AS CLOSE AS THE FIRST. THERE IS A FRAGILE MAJORITY. IT WILL PROBABLY PASS BY A NARROW VOTE AND IN A FORM WHICH WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PANAMANIAN. SENATE REJECTION WOULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS RAMIFICATIONS, NOT ONLY FOR THE SITUATION IN PANAMA, BUT
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FOR US RELATIONS WITH COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA, AS WELL AS WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

36. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HOLLAND IS NOT RUSHING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE FOR THE ANTILLES BECAUSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ISLANDS HAVE NEVER BEEN VERY GOOD. VENEZUELA IS VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ARUBA BREAKING AWAY FROM THE OTHERS. HOLLAND WANTS A UNIFIED INDEPENDENCE FOR THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES.

CHILE AND ARGENTINA

37. ACCORDING TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THE GON HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED BY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE. CHILE IS ITSELF FEELING ISOLATED IN LATIN AMERICA AND PERHAPS FOR THIS REASON HAS BEEN IMPROVING THE POLITICAL SITUATION. THE SECRETARY SAID FOR THE FIRST TIME THE US ALSO SEES SOME MOVEMENT. RECENT STEPS GIVE SOME PROMISE THAT CHILE IS MOVING OUT OF THE PAST AND BRINGING ITSELF BACK INTO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, CHILE HAS BEEN HELPFUL IN THE LATELIER CASE.

38. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, ONE TENDS TO VIEW EVENTS IN CHILE WITH SKEPTICISM. THE US HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED BY CHILE'S ALLOWING POLITICAL PRISONERS TO LEAVE AND BY THE EARLY RETIREMENT OF GENERAL CONTRERAS. SOME OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE ALSO BEEN ALLOWED TO RETURN. MR. LAKE NOTED THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CHILE PRESENTS THE US WITH ONE OF ITS HARDER HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS. IN ABSOLUTE TERMS THE CONDITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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IN CHILE IS NOT GOOD. HOWEVER, RELATIVELY, THERE HAS BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENT AND THIS IS A TREND WE WOULD LIKE TO ENCOURAGE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID CHILE NEEDS ENCOURAGEMENT. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ORDER TO AVOID A RETURN TO MORE REPRESSION. MR. RUTTEN SAID WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE A POSITION ON THE CHILEAN SITUATION WHEN IT COMES UP IN THE UNGA AND THE US POSITION WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT.

AT THE LAST UNGA THE US WAS A QTE HARDLINER UNQTE ON CHILE.

39. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE DUTCH WAS NOW OFF CHILE AND ONTO ARGENTINA. THE SECRETARY SAID THE US IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE DRIFT BACKWARD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. MR. RUTTEN SAID THE NINE HAVE MADE A STRONG DEMARCHE TO ARGENTINA ABOUT THE APPROXIMATELY 60 PERSONS MISSING FROM EC COUNTRIES.

NORTH/SOUTH

40. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID A REMARKABLE ASPECT OF THIS DISCUSSION IN THE EC IS THE FEELING THAT THERE IS MORE COMPETITION FROM THE LDCS. THE SECRETARY AGREED, NOTING THAT BRAZIL NOW CONSIDERS ITSELF AT THE SAME TIME A DEVELOPING AND A DEVELOPED COUNTRY. MEXICO IS ALSO BEGINNING TO HAVE THE SAME PERCEPTION AND IS COMING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE TWO SIDES TO THE NORTH/SOUTH PROBLEM.

CLOSING REMARKS

41. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, IN THANKING THE SECRETARY FOR THE MEETING, INVITED HIM TO VISIT THE HAGUE.

42. DUTCH PARTICIPANTS WERE: THE FOREIGN MINISTER,
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AMBASSADOR TAMMENOMS BAKKER, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS RUTTEN, DIRECTOR FOR NATO AFFAIRS VAN VLOTTEN, DIRECTOR FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS DANIELS AND FIRST SECRETARY ZANDVLIET. US PARTICIPANTS WERE: THE SECRETARY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY; UNDER SECRETARY COOPER; UNDER SECRETARY BENSON; THE COUNSELOR, MR. NIMET; DIRECTOR FOR POLICY PLANNING, MR. LAKE; ASSISTANT SECRETARY VEST; MR. HUNTER, NSC; DIRECTOR FOR NORTHERN EUROPE FUNSETH, AND AT THE MEETING ONLY, DESK OFFICER NEWLIN.

CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Document Unique ID: 00
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Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS-1
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
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From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
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Litigation History:
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Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
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Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
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Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
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Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2830089
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER KLAUW, APRIL 11, 1978
TAGS: PEPR, PARM, MNUC, NE, XA, XF, CI, AR, NATO, EEC, (VAN DER KLAUW, CHRISTOPH)
To: THE HAGUE
Type: TE
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